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  The link between cell phone use while driving and crash risk has in recent years 
become an area of active research. The most notable of the over 125 studies has 
concluded that cell phones produce a four-fold increase in relative crash risk—
comparable to that produced by illicit levels of alcohol. In response, policy makers in 
fourteen states have either partially or fully restricted driver cell phone use. We 
investigate the causal link between cellular usage and crash rates by exploiting a natural 
experiment induced by a popular feature of cell phone plans in recent years—the 
discontinuity in marginal pricing at 9 pm on weekdays when plans transition from “peak” 
to “off-peak” pricing. We first document a jump in call volume of about 20-30% at 
“peak” to “off-peak” switching times for two large samples of callers from 2000-2001 
and 2005. Using a double difference estimator which uses the era prior to price switching 
as a control (as well as weekends as a second control), we find no evidence for a rise in 
crashes after 9 pm on weekdays from 2002-2005. The 95% CI of the estimates rules out 
any increase in all crashes larger than .9% and any increase larger than 2.4% for fatal 
crashes. These estimates are at odds with the crash risks implied by the existing research. 
We confirm our results with three additional empirical approaches—we compare trends 
in cell phone ownership and crashes across areas of contiguous economic activity over 
time, investigate whether differences in urban versus rural crash rates mirror identified 
gaps in urban-rural cellular ownership, and finally estimate the impact of legislation 
banning driver cell phone use on crash rates. None of the additional analyses produces 
evidence for a positive link between cellular use and vehicle crashes. 
 Driving Under the (Cellular) In￿ uence: The Link Between
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Abstract
The link between cell phone use while driving and crash risk has in recent years
become an area of active research. The most notable of the over 125 studies has con-
cluded that cell phones produce a four-fold increase in relative crash risk￿comparable
to that produced by illicit levels of alcohol. In response, policy makers in fourteen
states have either partially or fully restricted driver cell phone use. We investigate the
causal link between cellular usage and crash rates by exploiting a natural experiment
induced by a popular feature of cell phone plans in recent years￿the discontinuity in
marginal pricing at 9 pm on weekdays when plans transition from "peak" to "o⁄-peak"
pricing. We ￿rst document a jump in call volume of about 20-30% at "peak" to "o⁄-
peak" switching times for two large samples of callers from 2000-2001 and 2005. Using
a double di⁄erence estimator which uses the era prior to price switching as a control (as
well as weekends as a second control), we ￿nd no evidence for a rise in crashes after 9
pm on weekdays from 2002-2005. The 95% CI of the estimates rules out any increase in
all crashes larger than .9% and any increase larger than 2.4% for fatal crashes. These
estimates are at odds with the crash risks implied by the existing research. We con-
￿rm our results with three additional empirical approaches￿we compare trends in cell
phone ownership and crashes across areas of contiguous economic activity over time,
investigate whether di⁄erences in urban versus rural crash rates mirror identi￿ed gaps
in urban-rural cellular ownership, and ￿nally estimate the impact of legislation banning
driver cell phone use on crash rates. None of the additional analyses produces evidence
for a positive link between cellular use and vehicle crashes.
￿PRELIMINARY VERSION. We would like to thank David Card, Stefano Della Vigna, Robert Hahn,
Michael Greenstone, Botond Koszegi, Prasad Krishnamurthy, Ritu Mahajan, Enrico Moretti, James Prieger,
Matthew Rabin, Aman Vora, Glenn Woroch and participants of the IGERT workshop at the Goldman School
of Public Policy for their thoughtful comments. Gregory Duncan, Nathan Eagle, Je⁄ May, and Econ One
Research made important data contributions. We would also like to thank the IBER for providing funding
for this project.
11 Introduction
Does talking on a cell phone while driving increase your risk of a crash? The popular
belief is that it does ￿a recent Gallup poll found that 70% of Americans believe that cell
phone use by drivers causes crashes (Gallup 2003). This sentiment is echoed by recent
research. Over the last few years, more than 125 published studies have examined the
impact of driver cell phone use on vehicular crashes.1 The most widely cited of these have
identi￿ed clear links between cellular usage and crash risk.
Experimental and epidemiological studies have even equated the relative crash risk
of phone use while driving to that produced by illicit levels of alcohol (Redelmeier and
Tibshirani 1997; Strayer and Drews and Crouch 2006). If alcohol, however, is responsible
for 40% of fatal and 7% of all crashes each year, as reported by the National Highway
Tra¢ c Safety Administration (NHTSA), then Figure 1 illustrates a puzzle (2006). Cell
phone ownership has grown sharply since 1990, average use per subscriber has risen from
140 to 740 minutes a month since 1993, and surveys indicate that as many as 40% of drivers
have at some point used their phones while driving (CTIA 2006)￿yet aggregate crash rates
have fallen substantially over this period.2
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1As counted by McCartt et. al. 2006.
2The ￿gure plots fatal and all crashes nationwide from 1988 to 2005 per billion highway miles traveled.
Fatal crashes were from collected from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) database, while all
crash data was estimated from the General Estimates System (GES). Penetration data was collected from
CTIA wireless surveys. Volume data is from the Federal Highway Administration.
1In this paper, we exploit a natural experiment in order to cleanly identify the impact
of cell phone use on both fatal and non-fatal crashes. Our most credible research design
suggests that current cell phone use does not result in a measurable increase in vehicular
crashes. We are able to reject, with a 95% con￿dence interval, any rise in fatal crashes larger
than 2.4% and any rise for all crashes of .9%. It should be noted, however, that our result
is not inconsistent with the claim that cell phones are a source of attentional distraction.
One possible explanation is that drivers compensate for the dangers of cell phone use by
driving more carefully. This argument is similar to one articulated by Peltzman in his
consideration of the e⁄ects of seat belt use (1975). We explore other rationale for the
absence of a link between current cellular use and crashes in the discussion below.
Past attempts to link cell phone use and driver safety have relied on a variety of method-
ologies. These range from cross-sectional surveys of large groups of drivers, simulations
in the lab, inspection of crash reports, observational analyses using in-car cameras or con-
federate observers, longitudinal studies of small samples of drivers, as well as correlative
analyses of aggregate cell ownership and crash records. This research has located the per-
centage of crashes attributable to cell phone use anywhere from 0 to 33% of the 6 million
crashes and 45,000 fatal crashes which occur each year which is equivalent to as many as 4
crashes a minute for each minute of the day.3 However, despite the value of these studies,
because of the di¢ culties associated with causal inferences in this setting, much of the
existing research is open to scrutiny due to either questionable econometric identi￿cation
or doubtful external validity.
The need to accurately gauge the detrimental in￿ uence of cell phones resonates far
beyond academic discourse. Every state has considered some form of legislation to restrict
the usage of cell phones ￿or requiring the usage of hands-free devices ￿while driving for
some or all groups of drivers. According to the American Automotive Association, fourteen
states already have such legislation on the books (AAA 2007).4
If the media coverage is to be believed, much of the political dialogue produced by
legislative initiatives has centered around, and often even been prompted by, one or many
of the published estimates. In a 1997 issue of the New England Journal of Medicine,
Redelmeier and Tibshirani (hereafter "RT") published perhaps the most frequently cited
estimate of the increase in crash risk due to cell phone use (Redelmeier and Tibshirani 1997;
Hahn and Prieger 2006). Using an epidemiological design, they concluded that cell phones
produced a 4.3 fold increase in the relative likelihood of a crash. This implies an 20%
3We discuss how we arrived at this characterization of the literature below.
4Three states have complete bans on hand-held cell phone use by drivers, while an additional 11 states
have partial bans primarily targeting younger drivers. Several other states ban cell phone use by those
driving school busses.
2increase in annual crashes.5 Given the strength of our research design, we believe that our
paper may meaningfully add to the discourse regarding the e¢ cacy of policies restricting
driver cell phone usage.
We identify and size driver sensitivity to changes in cell phone use through a series of
distinct estimation strategies. Our favored empirical approach combines a regression dis-
continuity design with a double di⁄erence estimator in order to assess the relative increase
in crashes around the time of the day￿9pm on weekdays￿when cell phone providers sys-
tematically transition from ￿peak￿to ￿o⁄-peak￿pricing. Based on the assumption that a
discontinuous rise in prices drives sharp increases in call volume ￿an assumption for which
we provide evidence￿we exploit the presence of pricing thresholds across weekdays and not
weekends, as well as the recency of plans with the 9pm pricing threshold to assess the rela-
tive impact of additional call volume on crash rates. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of
cellular call volume across weekdays and weekends for a sample of callers in 2005. The plot
depicts an approximately 24% relative rise in phone calls at the weekday 9pm threshold.6
Figure 3 conveys our basic result for fatal crashes from all states in 2005.7 Crash
rates do not appear to change across the 9pm threshold on weekdays relative to weekends
during this period. Given the RT estimates of relative crash risk, the size of the observed
discontinuity in call volume, and a conservative assumption of driver cell phone use, we
would expect to see an 2 to 6% rise in crashes in the hour following the threshold.8
5We discuss the assumptions underlying this calculation later in the paper.
6We recognize that call volume is a function of both calls made as well as call duration. Later, we
demonstrate that the call duration remains unchanged across the threshold implying that call volume rises
in proportion to calls made. Additionally, while the 24% rise cited here is derived from 2005 data, we have
a second dataset from 2000-2001 which indicates an even larger rise in calls made at the threshold. We
discuss both pieces of evidence in greater detail below.
7Data for non-fatal crashes is not available for 2005.
8This estimated range assumes a 4 to 7% driver usage rate, and relies on estimates from the two samples
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Weekday & Weekend Call Volume I
Figure 2, Outgoing Calls from 8pm –10pm in 2005
(10 mn bins)
Figure 3, Fatal Crashes from 8pm – 10pm in 2005
(10 mn bins)












































Figure 3, Fatal Crashes from 8pm – 10pm in 2005
(10 mn bins)
Weekday & Weekend Crashes (Fatal)
Weekend
Weekday
Figure 3, Fatal Crashes from 8pm – 10pm in 2005
(10 mn bins)












































As a second, and arguably more reliable control, Figure 4 compares the rate of all
crashes from weekday evenings during the "post" period characterized by high cellular plan
conformity around the 9pm threshold (2002-2004) with a period preceding the introduc-
4tion of tiered pricing plans (1990 - 1998) across the six states for which crash records are
available.9 Again, the plot o⁄ers no noticeable evidence for a rise in relative crash rates at
9pm during the post period.
Figure 4, All Crashes from 7pm – 11pm
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Figure 4, All Crashes from 7pm – 11pm
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As robustness checks, we present three additional empirical analyses. A ￿rst approach
involves comparing yearly variation in regional cellular ownership against yearly changes
in crash rates. Our unit of analysis is an "economic area" (EA). De￿ned by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis to denote regions of contiguous economic activity, EAs represent the
most disaggregated geographic units for which ownership data is available. We exploit the
non-linear, and heterogeneous pickup of cellular technology across these EAs in order to
estimate any resulting increase in the crash rate. To our knowledge, this is the ￿rst paper
to present region-year regressions of driver cell phone risk at the level of the EA.
Due to the absence of data on cell phone ownership more highly disaggregated than an
EA, a second estimation exploits the additional variation provided by historical di⁄erences
in the rate of cell phone ownership across rural and urban areas over time. We ￿rst
document a lag in the rate of growth of cell phone coverage in rural as compared to urban
areas. We then assess the change in crashes in largely urban areas over time from those of
more rural controls. Finally, recognizing that some states have recently enacted complete
bans on hand-held cellular usage we analyze the impact of this legislation on crash rates.
9The ￿gure displays aggregated crash rates for CA, IL, MD, MO, NM, PA for 20 minute bins from 7pm
to 11pm. However, given the exclusion of particular states in particular years due to data availability, the
￿gure does not represent a balanced panel across state-years.
5None of these strategies suggests a signi￿cantly positive relationship between cell phone use
and vehicular crash rates.
This paper relies on an extensive dataset of fatal and non-fatal crashes, as well as data
on provider pricing plans, cell phone subscriptions at the EA level (since 2001) and national
level (since 1985), the quality of cell phone reception across time and across regions, and
perhaps most novel, data on the actual distribution of calls from two samples of callers from
2000-2001 and 2005. The crash data includes a census of all crash records for California,
Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico and Pennsylvania, for most of the years
from 1990 - 2004, as well as the census of fatalities from all states from 1987 ￿2005. We
investigate both fatal and all crashes due to the suspicion that these crash types may be
di⁄erentially sensitive to use of cellular phones, as well as the increased statistical power
provided by the far higher frequency of non-fatal crashes.
Beyond contributing to the literature on the danger of cellular use, our paper is very
much in the spirit of studies which use natural experiments to assess the e⁄ect of driver
behavior on crash risk (Levitt & Porter 2001a; Levitt & Porter 2001b). This study can
also be linked to the literature examing the theory of compensating behavior with respect
to driving risk factors (Cohen and Einav 2003; Peltzman 1975).
Though our paper represents a departure from past studies, it is not without its limi-
tations. Our strongest estimation strategy￿that of the pricing regression discontinuity￿is
handicapped by considerable heaping in the time at which crashes are reported. Addition-
ally, the analysis yields only a local treatment e⁄ect of cell phone use by drivers at the 9pm
pricing threshold. This complicates e⁄orts to translate estimates to an aggregate welfare
e⁄ect. While the panel analysis across region-years is not a local estimation, it does su⁄er
from the absence of ownership data for the critical period of pickup, as well as possible
bias through omitted confounds. Further, the comparison between urban and rural areas
involves imputed rather than computed di⁄erences in ownership. Finally, the analysis of
legislative bans is impaired by a lack of power due to the few regions which have enacted
bans, as well as to the recency of such bans. We address each of these issues in the course
of our discussions below.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the background
of research on the link between cell phones and crashes. Section III describes the main and
alternative empirical approaches and presents the results of the analysis. In Section IV,
we translate our estimates into annual crash rates and discuss our results in the context
of existing research. Finally, Section V o⁄ers conclusions, and discusses drawbacks of the
study as well as possible directions for future research.
62 Background
The sharp rise in cell phone ownership over the last several years has been paced by an
equally rapid rise in research examining the e⁄ect of such ownership on vehicular crashes.
Ignoring the substantial literature on the cognitive and neural underpinnings of limited
attention and multi-tasking, explicit analyses of crash risk due to cellular use generally
fall into one of ￿ve major methodological categories: (1) Experimental studies that focus
on subject behavior in simulated, or highly controlled, driving conditions, (2) naturalistic
studies of drivers on the actual road, (3) studies which inspect police annotations of crash
records, (4) correlative analyses of aggregate crash records and cell phone ownership, and (5)
longitudinal analyses of individual level phone and crash records. Beyond estimating the
impact of phone use on crashes, other researchers have attempted to accurately measure the
extent to which driver cell phone use occurs. Several excellent surveys of these literatures
exist (Hahn and Prieger 2006; McCartt et. al. 2006; Hahn and Dudley 2002; Lissy et. al.
2000; Hahn and Tetlock and Burnett 2000).
In the standard experimental paradigm, a researcher assesses subject driving perfor-
mance in a simulator across a variety of metrics (e.g. crash frequency, driving speed,
reaction time for braking, following distance, obedience of tra¢ c signals, time to crash
etc.) under varying forms of distraction. These studies generally conclude that subjects
instructed to use cell phones while driving are 3-4 times more "impaired" than their unen-
cumbered counterparts (Strayer and Drews and Johnston 2003). Authors of this research
have even compared the e⁄ects of cellular use to moderate levels of intoxication (Strayer
and Drews and Crouch 2006). Many of these studies have found heterogeneous treatment
e⁄ects, with, for instance, older drivers being more susceptible to impairment than middle-
aged drivers, and mixed evidence for the e⁄ect for younger drivers (McCartt et. al. 2006).
Importantly, these studies ￿nd no di⁄erences between hand-held and hands-free devices.10
A bene￿t of simulations is that they are able to assess relative levels of impairment
across various forms of distractions, as well as to illuminate the speci￿c capacities that are
likely to be impaired. Indeed, given the sophistication of simulation environments, as well
as the precision of the measurements, studies in the lab may be best positioned to precisely
size the levels of impairment attributable to any form of distraction including cellular use.
A shortcoming of such studies, however, is the questionable external validity￿i.e. it is
unclear whether cell phone use in simulations is analogous to use in environments where
driver well-being, or, even survival, is at stake. It is plausible, for instance, that drivers
10Not all of the experimental evidence points to increased crash risk. Some experimental studies have
documented compensatory responses to cell phone use such as drivers slowing down or allowing more distance
between vehicles. Subjects in other studies have been shown to adapt to distractions through repeated
trials.
7in the ￿eld compensate for cellular use with more cautious driving. Finally, experimental
studies tend to produce estimates of relative, but not absolute, crash risk.
A second set of naturalistic studies employ visual and audio recording devices to monitor
driver behavior in ecological conditions. In an example of one such study, "The 100-Car
Naturalistic Study," researchers equipped 100 vehicles with ￿ve cameras and a series of
sensors distributed throughout the vehicle and tracked 241 primary and secondary drivers
for over 1 year (NHTSA 2006). Having collected nearly 43,000 hours of driving data, the
authors found that 78% of the 69 crashes and 65% of the 761 "near-crashes" committed by
drivers in their sample were due to some form of driver inattention. They calculated that
dialing a cell phone increased the approximate risk of a crash by a factor of 3, while listening
or speaking with a cellular device caused drivers to be 1.3 times more likely to have a crash.
The majority of near-crashes were associated with cellular use. Much like the experimental
studies, naturalistic approaches highlight the speci￿c causes of driver impairment as well as
their relative dangers. It is unclear, however, given the nature of the monitoring involved,
whether such studies improve upon the external validity of studies conducted in the lab.
Further, because of the high costs of these studies, the sample sizes are often too small,
and unrepresentative, to meaningfully infer crash risk (Lissy et. al. 2000).
A number of studies exploit the existence of police annotations of crash reports to esti-
mate the e⁄ect of cell phone use on crashes.11 Studies examining police reports attribute
approximately one percent of crashes to phone use (Lissy et. al. 2000). However, at-
tempts to infer the causal e⁄ects of cell phone use from crash reports su⁄er from drawbacks
including source unreliability (NHTSA 1997), and the increasing salience of cell phones
as a reported determinant over time (McCartt 2006). Most importantly, one cannot infer
causality from correlations between police reports and crashes since the growth in cell phone
ownership amongst drivers should mechanically increase the observed fraction of police re-
ports mentioning such use during a crash. For example, a rise in cell phone ownership
from 50% to 75% would produce an increase in the proportion of crash reports citing cell
phone use due both to an increase in impaired driving, as well as an increase in innocuous
phone use. Disentangling these e⁄ects is not possible.
One strategy through which to generate absolute estimates of crash risk is by comparing
aggregate trends in cell phone ownership with trends in crash rates. Researchers have
examined correlations between crashes and phone ownership at the state, national and local
levels (Lissy et. al. 2000). Studies in this class generally ￿nd no statistically signi￿cant
link between cellular use and crashes (Lissy et. al. 2000). Given the strong secular
trends in overall crashes, trend analyses which aspire to identify the possibly modest e⁄ect
11Three states ￿Oklahoma, Minnesota and Tennessee￿explicitly include distraction via use of cell phones
as a standardized query on police reports (Lissy 2000). In other states or localities, case-reports or police
narratives may o⁄er explanations of crash causes (Goodman 1999; others, see McCartt 2006).
8of cellular use are not considered persuasive (Min and Redelmeier 1998). An additional
complication the aggregate approach is that often there is not very much variation in rates
of cell phone ownership to exploit, and appropriately disaggregated data on ownership is
di¢ cult to obtain.
A ￿nal class of studies tracks both phone use and driving behavior for a small number
of drivers over a particular period (Dreyer and Loughlin and Rothman 1999; Violanti 1998;
Redelmeier and Tibshirani 1997; Violanti and Marshall 1996). The most widely cited of
these is the analysis by Redelmeier and Tibshirani (RT) (1997). In the paper, the authors
inspect the crash records and detailed phone bills for 699 Toronto drivers recently involved
in a minor car crash. To control for heterogeneity in driver quality, the paper relies on
a technique commonly employed in epidemiological research to study the health e⁄ects of
transient exposure to a risk factor. For each driver, the authors compare exposure to cell
phone use immediately prior to the crash, with such exposure during a crash free control
period one day before the crash occurred. By examining the relative use of cell phones
during the two periods, the authors are able to control for driver speci￿c variation in crash
likelihood. They then used a conditional logit regression to infer the relative risk of a
crash due to cell phone use. The paper concludes that the use of cell phones increased the
relative likelihood of a crash by a factor of 4.3 (with a 95 percent con￿dence interval of 3.0
to 6.0). The study fails to ￿nd signi￿cant di⁄erences in increased crash risk across age or
gender.
While the paper is considered perhaps the most convincing example of this, or any
class, of studies, Hahn and Prieger point out that a major drawback with the RT result is
that the study relies on a very unrepresentative sample (2006). Any simple correlation of
crashes and phone use for only those drivers recently involved in a crash is confounded by
selection. If drivers with greater risk of crashing while using cell phones are overrepresented
in the RT sample, the relative risk estimate would then be an upper bound for the broader
population of drivers. An additional concern with the RT study is that while the case
crossover method does control for ￿xed driver characteristics, it does not control for time
varying unobservables. For instance, bored or stressed drivers may be likely, to both, use cell
phones and drive poorly due to mental distraction. In this case, the observed relative risk
could simply re￿ ect correlation of cell phone usage and crashes which are both derived from
underlying boredom or anxiety. Finally, much like naturalistic or experimental studies, the
analysis produces estimates of relative risk which are not easy to translate into aggregate
estimates of crash impact.
A more recent paper used a nearly identical methodology to investigate the e⁄ects of
cell phone exposure for drivers in Perth, Western Australia (McEvoy et. al. 2005). The
authors ￿nd that hand-held devices increased crash risk by a factor of 4.9 (with a 95 percent
9con￿dence interval of 1.6 to 15.5). Consistent with experimental ￿ndings, the researchers
also found no signi￿cant di⁄erence between handheld and hands-free devices.12
In summary, researchers have adopted a number of methodological approaches to esti-
mate the in￿ uence of cellular phones on crashes. Table 1 summarizes the range of e⁄ect
sizes estimated for analyses from each methodological class. In order to meaningfully com-
pare estimates of increased relative risk with those of increased absolute risk, it is necessary
to translate the former ￿gures into predicted changes in aggregate crash counts. Such a
translation critically relies on the accuracy of assumptions regarding the frequency with
which drivers use their cell phones.
Table 1
EFFECT OF CELLULAR USE ON CRASH RISK: COMPARISON BY METHODOLOGY
EXTRAPOLATED
RELATIVE RISK ABSOLUTE RISK
X 0 to 1.4% increase in crashes
3 to 4 times impairment 20 to 30% increase in all crashes
(Strayer 2003; Strayer 2006)
1.3 times collision risk 3% increase in all crashes
(NHTSA 2006)
Police Annotations X 1% increase in all crashes
(Lissy et. al. 2000)
X 0% increase in all crashes
(Min and Redelmeier, 1998)
4.3 times collision risk 33% increase in all crashes






A number of studies attempt to estimate the frequency of such use. These include
surveys which query drivers regarding patterns of usage, as well as observational studies
where experimenters stationed at an intersection, for example, record behavior of ongoing
tra¢ c.13 An example of the latter, the 2006 National Occupant Protection Use Survey
(NOPUS) observes some 126,000 vehicles at 1,878 probabilistically sampled roadways and
￿nds that 6% of drivers were using handheld cell phones at any point during the day
and that an additional 4% were on hands-free phones (NHTSA 2006b). Earlier surveys
indicate that the rate of handheld use has been increasing over the last several years from
5% in 2004, 4% in 2002, and 3% in 2000 (Glassbrenner 2005). The NOPUS survey also
12Analagous studies have not been conducted in the United States due to the absence of billing records
from domestic cell phone providers.
13See McCartt et al. 2006 for a thorough review of the literature.
10hints at considerable heterogeneity in cellular use across driver age and location￿but not
gender ￿with handheld cell phone use of drivers from 16-24 years approaching as high as
ten percent (Glassbrenner 2005). The only study of which we are aware that explicitly
considers di⁄erential usage across the day involves an assessment of driver behavior in
40,000 photographs taken of vehicles on the high-speed NJ Turnpike in 2001 (Johnson et.
al. 2004). The authors ￿nd no signi￿cant di⁄erence between driver cellular usage during
the late evening (i.e. from 8pm to 12am) from the afternoon (i.e. from 12pm to 4pm).
Given these estimates of driver cell phone use, Table 1 presents extrapolations of the
increased absolute crash risk implied by studies of relative crash risk. Our extrapolations
assume (1) the 10% NOPUS rate of (handheld and hands-free) cell phone usage and (2)
randomization in usage across driver type. Assuming for example, that cell phone use
occurs during 10% of total driving time, then, abstracted from selection e⁄ects, a 4.3 fold
increase in the relative likelihood of a crash translates to an expected 33% increase in total
crashes. Accordingly, estimates of the e⁄ect of cell phone use on the change in total crashes
range from 0 to 33%.14
3 Empirical Analysis
This section describes the data, the experimental design for each estimation strategy, and
presents the empirical ￿ndings. Four sets of empirical results are provided. First, we
provide evidence for the sensitivity of call volumes to discontinuities in marginal cellular
call prices, and then measure how drivers respond to the time thresholds which mark
such sharp price changes. Speci￿cally, we document that, since 2002, most cellular users
subscribe to plans with a 9 pm weekday pricing threshold after which time usage carries a
near zero marginal cost. We then provide evidence for a jump in weekday, but not weekend,
call volume immediately after 9 pm. Finally, we check for a rise in crashes corresponding
to this documented rise in weekday call volume. We compare the di⁄erence in the crash
rate after and before 9pm on weekdays since 2002, to the same period during the era prior
to the introduction of pre-paid plans (prior to 1998).
As additional evidence, we present results of yearly regressions of both fatal and all
crashes on cell phone ownership across EAs over the period from 1987 to 2005. We
then argue that rural areas within an EA lag urban areas in cellular ownership, and we
investigate whether urban-rural di⁄erentials in crash rates mirror the urban-rural gap in
cellular ownership. Finally, we attempt to estimate the e⁄ect of recent legislative bans on
14These calculations do not take into account possible heterogeneity of cell phone use across drivers. If
only very risky drivers use cell phones, for example, and the use of cell phones is merely a substitute of
one form of distraction from another, then our extrapolations may represent upper bounds of the predicted
e⁄ect ranges.
11handheld phones.
3.1 Summary of Data
Several data sources were used in this analysis (they are summarized in Table A1 in the
Appendix). Each of the empirical approaches in this paper relies on crash count data, as
well as data on changes in cell phone ownership. Data for the entire universe of fatal crash
records from 1987 to 2005 for each of the 50 states was attained from the Fatality Analysis
Reporting System (FARS). Any vehicular crash which results in the death of a motorist or
non-motorist within 30 days of the crash is captured in the FARS database. Data for the
universe of total crashes for varying periods from 1990 to 2005 was acquired for California,
Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania through the State
Data System (SDS). SDS and FARS are administered by the NHTSA which collects crash
records from participating state agencies. A total of eighteen states participate in the SDS,
but only seven states release data which is both recent and covers the universe of crashes.
Figure 1 depicts the rate of fatal and all crashes, indexed to highway tra¢ c volume, for
each year from 1988 to 2005. Data on all crashes in this ￿gure is based on nationwide sample
conducted by the General Estimates Survey (GES) of the NHTSA. The plot indicates a
decrease in fatal and all crashes over the last ￿fteen years, with a slight rise in the mid
1990s. The increasing prevalence and usage of safety devices as well as the decline in driver
alcohol use is likely to have contributed to the drop in fatal and non-fatal crashes over this
period (NHTSA 2005). The mild rise in the mid 1990s can be at least partially attributed
to relaxation in nationwide speeding regulations. In recent years, there have been about
40,000 fatal crashes a year, and approximately 6 million total crashes each year nationwide.
An important unit of analysis in this paper is at the level of the Economic Area. 172
EAs were originally de￿ned by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and are currently
used by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to denote regions of contiguous
economic activity. Each EA consists of one or more economic nodes - a metropolitan
or micropolitan statistical area that serves as a regional economic center. Examples of
EAs include "Minneapolis-St.Paul", "Washington-Baltimore", as well as the largest "New
York- Northern New Jersey - Long Island." In 2000, the BEA uniquely mapped counties
to an Economic Area. We use these mappings in order to construct EA level crash and
population data. Table A2 in the Appendix provides EA level summary statistics on cell
phone ownership, population, and crash rates.
Data on cell phone subscribers for each EA from 2001 to 2005 was collected from
the FCC (2006). Historical population data was downloaded from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics website. Figure A1 in the Appendix depicts trends in cell phone ownership
nationwide as well as the growth in the average usage of each phone per user (FCC 2006).
12Overall, both ownership and usage increased exponentially over this period. By 2005, 2
of every 3 residents in a typical state owned a cell phone despite only 1 of 3 owning a cell
phone just six years earlier.
Data on annual highway tra¢ c volume for all states from 1989 to 2005 was obtained
from the Federal Highway Tra¢ c Administration. Tra¢ c volume data was collected from
counting stations positioned on roadways across the country. Total tra¢ c volume on U.S.
highways grew from 162 billion miles in January of 1990 to 222 billion miles in January
2005.
The central empirical strategy in this paper is based on the presumption that disconti-
nuities in cell phone pricing prompt sharp increases in cell phone call volume. To illustrate
this ￿rst stage relationship between call volume and call pricing, complete logs of cell phone
activity for approximately 65 students and faculty over the course of 2005 were obtained
from the Reality Mining Project (RMP) at the MIT Media Lab (Eagle 2006). As part of a
broader project examining the evolution of social networks and the transmission of informa-
tion, the RMP embedded surveillance technology in the cellular phones of each subject in
the sample. Approximately 80,000 outgoing calls were logged over the course of the surveil-
lance period. The bene￿t of electronic logs is that call timings were accurately documented
to the second. However, because data comprised entirely of MIT students and faculty is
unrepresentative, we appeal to a second dataset of phone calls of over 560,000 calls made
by 9,406 cell phone users from U.S. households in 2000 and 2001 (TNS 2001).15 The latter
data was harvested from cellular phone bills voluntarily submitted from households that had
been randomly selected to participate in an earlier, broader survey of telecommunications
behavior and attitudes. The broader survey was administered by TNS Telecom, a ￿rm
which specializes in Telecom data collection. While this data is likely to be representative,
it is hourly data, and is from a period characterized by non-uniform plan thresholds ranging
from 6 to 10pm, or no threshold at all. However, the data usefully provides "peak" and
"o⁄-peak" designations for each call, and allows for the analysis of individual call patterns.
Data on historical cellular pricing plans was obtained through surveys of cell phone
provider websites conducted monthly from 2002 to 2005 by Econ One Research.16 The
surveys detail the availability of pricing plans by provider, the schedule of marginal prices
per call, as well as the time threshold at which tiered pricing plans switch from peak to
o⁄-peak pricing. While the survey targeted New York City, we assume that the pricing
details of national calling plans available to New York subscribers were similar to those
available to other users nationwide. Market shares for each provider were collected from
15While TNS Telecom continued to harvest cellular phone bills after 2001, we were unable to acquire this
data for a more recent period.
16Data gathered from the Econ One Wireless Survey. Survey is available at www.econone.com.
13S&P Industry Analysis Reports (S&P 2001-2006).
An alternative empirical approach in this paper exploits the di⁄erential cellular cover-
age in rural as compared to urban regions. Classi￿cations of the urban/rural character of
counties was collected from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Finally, for the analysis
of legislative bans, descriptions of state legislation was gathered from the American Au-
tomative Association as well as the National Conference of State Legislatures (AAA 2007;
NCSL 2005).
3.2 Vehicle Crashes & Price Discontinuities
In our ￿rst empirical approach, we rely on a regression discontinuity (RD), as well as a series
of counterfactuals to identify the change in crashes after a sharp and exogenous increase
in the usage of cell phones. If cell phone use does cause crashes, then an exogenous rise
in such use should be associated with a corresponding rise in crash rates. Discontinuities
in the marginal price of a cell phone call represent one source of exogenous variation in
usage. Accordingly, we ￿rst outline our estimation strategy and identifying assumptions.
Next we document the existence of a systematic, and transparent discontinuity in marginal
call prices during weekday evenings at 9pm. We then provide evidence that this price
discontinuity produces a discontinuous rise in cell phone usage. Finally, we estimate the
e⁄ect that increased usage has on the frequency of fatal and non-fatal crashes.
3.2.1 Estimation Strategy and Identifying Assumptions
Let Crashr;p;wk;h;w refer to the number of reported crashes in region r, hour h;minute
window w either on weekdays or weekends as signalled by wk, in either the "post" period,
p, characterized by high cell phone ownership and high plan conformity around a threshold,
or a "pre" period prior to the era of two-tiered monthly pricing plans. In this framework,
reported crashes are jointly determined by the tra¢ c level denoted by Trafficr;p;wk;h;w,
bias in the reporting of crashes denoted by RepBiasr;p;wk;h;w, and the covariate of interest,
cell phone use, which is denoted by Cellr;p;wk;h;w. We also include a vector of additional
covariates, Xr;p;wk;h, which we believe may in￿ uence the rate of vehicular crashes. These
factors include speeding regulations, weather conditions, and the availability and adoption
of safety technology:
(1) Crashr;p;wk;h;w = ￿ + ￿1Trafficr;p;wk;h;w + ￿2RepBiasr;p;wk;h;w
+ ￿3Xr;p;wk;h + ￿Cellr;p;wk;h;w + "r;p;wk;h;w
14Unbiased estimation of ￿, the causal e⁄ect of cell phone use on vehicular crashes, is
problematic since cell phone use is not randomized across drivers. Speci￿cally, it is possible
that drivers who use cell phones have a greater a¢ nity for risk, and that the risk a¢ nity
of drivers on the road (R) produces a higher likelihood of entering into a crash: E(" j R)
6= 0. Since Cellr;p;wk;h;w may also be a function of the risk a¢ nity of drivers, attempts to
estimate ￿ through OLS will be biased. One strategy through which to circumvent this
bias is if we assume that the distribution of unobserved driver risk is the same immediately
before the 9pm pricing threshold as it is immediately after the pricing threshold:
(2) lim
￿!0+ E("jR9pm+￿) = lim
￿!0+ E("jR9pm￿￿)
If we de￿ne a control function g(R) = E("r;p;wk;h;w j R) which is continuous through
the 9pm threshold, we are able to rewrite the above equation (2) as:
(3) Crashr;p;wk;h;w = ￿ + ￿1Trafficr;p;wk;h;w + ￿2 RepBiasr;p;wk;h;w
+ ￿3Xr;p;wk;h + ￿Cellr;p;wk;h;w + g(R) + vr;p;wk;h;w
where the error term v = " ￿ E("jR) is now independent of Cellr;p;wk;h;w. Given our
assumption of a continuous risk function at the pricing threshold, any break that we see at
that point in crashes should be attributable to the change in the remaining covariates￿tra¢ c
patterns, reporting bias, the controls included in X as well as cell phone use. We formalize
this RD at the threshold then, by calculating a ￿rst di⁄erence, Dr;1;1;h, which represents the
change in crashes during some time window immediately before the threshold from some
window immediately after the threshold. Intially, we restrict focus to weekdays during
the post period. Assuming that speeding regulations, weather, and safety technology
and compliance are unchanged locally around the threshold, Xr;1;1;h drops out of the ￿rst
di⁄erence:
(4) Dr;1;1;h = Crashr;1;1;h;w ￿ Crashr;1;1;h;w0 = ￿0
1￿Trafficr;1;1;h
+ ￿0
3￿RepBiasr;1;1;h + ￿0￿Cellr;1;1;h + v0
r;1;1;h
Intuitively, our RD model assumes that tra¢ c patterns and reporting bias may vary
across the threshold. The ￿ exibility that this assumption adds to the estimation will
15be explored more fully below. However, in the face of covariates which vary across the
threshold, we can calculate a second di⁄erence, DDr;1;h, by contrasting the di⁄erence (D)
in crashes around the time threshold during the "post" period from a "pre" period prior to
the threshold era:
(5) DDr;1;h = Dr;1;1;h ￿ Dr;0;1;h = ￿00(￿Cellr;1;1;h ￿ ￿Cellr;0;1;h) + v00
r;1;h
If we assume that the di⁄erence in tra¢ c as well as the di⁄erence in the reporting bias
around the threshold in the "pre" and "post" periods compared to weekends does not
systematically di⁄er, then the double di⁄erence in crash rates is simply a function of the
residual post-pre threshold di⁄erence in cell phone use.
Finally, to allay the concern that the di⁄erences in reporting bias across the threshold
may systematically vary across the "pre" and "post" periods, as a placebo test we can
analogously calculate a second double di⁄erence, for weekend periods. We discuss details
of the pricing discontinuity and document the subsequent change in cell phone call volume
below.
3.2.2 Price Discontinuities and Cell Phone Call Volumes
Pricing Plans. In recent years, contracts for cell phones have been characterized by a
￿ at monthly fee which entitles subscribers to a speci￿ed number of minutes depending on
the time of use. Any use in excess of this allotment is subject to relatively high marginal
fees. For instance, a "900 Nation" plan o⁄ered by Cingular in 2006 allows 900 minutes of
"peak" usage from 6am to 9pm each weekday, unlimited use for "o⁄-peak" periods after
9pm and before 6am on weekdays, and unlimited use all day on weekends.17 Marginal fees
for excess usage commonly vary from $.35 to $.45 per minute.
Table 2 documents the evening thresholds at which major providers distinguished be-
tween peak and o⁄-peak usage for national calling plans o⁄ered to New York subscribers
from 2002 to 2005.18 The table also describes the estimated share of new users associated
with each threshold in a given year. Unfortunately, calculating the share of users tied to a
particular threshold is di¢ cult because providers do not disclose plan level market shares
and turnover rates.
17Actual plans often specify some large, but ￿nite, limit for non-peak usage. Cingular for example,
establishes usage limits even for non-peak periods that are marketed as allowing for "unlimited" usage.
This limit is often 5,000 or 10,000 minutes.
18The table displays only those plans which were listed on the websites of each provider based on monthly
snapshots taken by EconOne Research for their Wireless Survey. National calling plans, which tend not to
distinguish between local and non-local calls, are most likely to feature the described pricing structure.
16We estimate threshold speci￿c shares by calculating the unweighted proportion of provider
plans associated with each threshold, and then weighting these ￿gures by the estimated lo-
cal market share of each provider reported in the table￿ s ￿nal column. While we expect
plans within a provider to vary in popularity, for the most part, our naive, unweighted,
estimation only confounds those few cases for which a provider has plans that do not share
a common threshold. Local market shares are extrapolated from national ￿gures published
in the S&P Industry Guide since the local shares for New York providers are not available
(S&P 2002-2006).
There is reason to believe that national plans in New York City may be representative of
broader o⁄erings in other markets. Although not all providers service all regions, national
calling plans o⁄ered by major providers are typically identical for subscribers regardless of
local origin. Therefore, New York City plans are likely to be approximately representative
of plans nationwide.
17Table 2
PRICING PLAN THRESHOLDS FOR NYC, 2002 - 2005
SWITCHING THRESHOLD
7PM 8PM 9PM MARKET SHARE
Sprint 0 0 22 0.17
AT&T 0 26 10 0.23
Verizon 0 0 42 0.35
Cingular 0 0 14 0.25
Total Share 0.00 0.17 0.83
Sprint 0 0 42 0.15
AT&T 0 0 18 0.20
Verizon 0 0 43 0.33
Cingular 30 0 30 0.21
T-mobile 0 0 8 0.11
Total Share 0.11 0.00 0.89
Sprint 82 0 68 0.16
AT&T 6 0 10 0.16
Verizon 0 0 58 0.29
Cingular 6 0 9 0.18
T-mobile 0 0 9 0.11
Nextel 0 0 3 0.10
Total Share 0.22 0.00 0.78
Sprint 46 0 64 0.16
Verizon 0 0 28 0.29
Cingular 0 0 12 0.32
T-mobile 0 0 12 0.12
Nextel 0 0 7 0.11
Total Share 0.07 0.00 0.93
2002
2004
Notes: The table displays the number of pricing plan listed by each provider on their website for New
York City subscribers as recorded monthly in the EconOne Wireless Survey.  The estimated total market
shares are generated by multiplying the unweighted fraction of plans associated with each time threshold
by the estimated market share reported in the last column.
2005
2003
Table 2 depicts strong consistency in available pricing plan options across providers for
the years from 2002 to 2005. By 2002, most providers had abandoned the 8pm threshold￿
which had been popular in earlier years￿in favor of a 9pm threshold. As a promotional
incentive, some providers in subsequent years began o⁄ering plans with earlier switching
times of 7pm. However, we estimate that at least 75% of new subscribers in each year since
2002 had enrolled in 9pm plans. Assuming a 1-2 year typical contract duration, and in
18light of the dramatic rise in cellular ownership since 2001, Table 2 suggests that, in recent
years, most active cellular users faced a 9pm threshold.
Cellular Call Volume. Does the existence of a sharp change in marginal minute
pricing lead to a corresponding change in the actual volume of calls? There is suggestive
evidence that cell phone subscribers are price sensitive. In a Pew Research Center survey
of 1503 people in 2006, 44% of cell phone users reported delaying their calls until they
did not count against their allotment of peak minutes.19 In another survey of 30,000 cell
phone users, only 7% admitted to exceeding their monthly allotment of minutes. Such
users were subject to "overage" fees which, on average, amounted to 50-60% of their usual
bill.20 It seems then that two-part tari⁄ pricing, coupled with the tiered allotment of
peak and o⁄-peak minutes, produces a salient discontinuity in price for many users during
weekday evenings.
We explicitly test for the correspondence between call price and usage at the plan switch-
ing threshold by using two rare datasets of actual calls.21 A ￿rst data set was acquired from
a research group at the MIT Media Lab which embedded surveillance technology in cellular
phones in order to track subject movements, interactions, and cellular communication over
the course of 1-2 years (Eagle and Pentland 2006). We examine the full distribution of
outgoing cell phone calls for 65 subjects￿comprised of both students and faculty￿over the
course of 2005.22 This amounts to more than 80,000 call records.
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of calls made by subjects in the sample over 10 minute
intervals from 8pm to 10pm across weekdays and weekends in 2005, while Figure A2 in the
appendix depicts call volumes across hourly intervals over a larger portion of the day. A
vertical line in each plot marks the 9pm threshold at which time the marginal price of calls
on weekdays￿but not weekends￿drops sharply. The latter ￿gure illustrates a steady rise
in call volume through the weekday afternoon and early evening, a modest drop at around
six o￿ clock, followed by a rise through the late evening. Call volumes are considerably less
variable on the weekends. This pattern of high evening and low afternoon weekday calling
seems consistent with a typical subject￿ s likely schedule (e.g. the start and end of classes
etc.).
Collectively the ￿gures indicate a sharp increase in the number of calls made immediately
after 9pm on weekdays but not weekends. The increase in calls is on the order of 15-25%
19Survey published in an Internet Project Data Memo entitled "Cell Phone Use" from April 2006.
20This is according to an analysis of 30,000 cell phone users conducted by Telephia as part of their
Customer Value Metrics Service, from 2006.
21Data on call volume is very di¢ cult to acquire. Providers generally view such data as propriety, and the
few third party ￿rms which maintain private databases of billing statements either do not release individual
call records, or make it available only at prohibitively high prices.
22Not all of the subjects remained in the sample for the course of the calendar year. Additionally, many
of the subjects surrendered their phones, or left the sample, over the summer. Consequently, call volumes
are much lower in summer months than during the rest of the year.
19and seems to persist at least until midnight. Table 3 explicitly enumerates the change in call
volumes in windows of varying lengths around each hour from 7pm to 10pm on weekdays
relative to the same change on weekends. Standard errors are reported parenthetically
for the 9pm threshold. The table con￿rms the pattern evident in the ￿gures￿call volume
increases by 16% from 9pm to 10pm on weekdays, and is unchanged over this period on
weekends. Proximal weekday hours do not exhibit similarly pronounced changes in call
volume.
Table 3
7PM 8PM 9PM 10PM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
10 minute bins 10% -3% 24% 1%
(9%)***
20 minute bins 4% 7% 22% 2%
(9%)***
30 minute bins 2% 3% 18% 2%
(9%)**
60 minute bins 8% 12% 16% -1%
(12%)
10 minute bins 0% 18% 8% 2%
(8%)
20 minute bins 6% 17% 5% 5%
(5%)
30 minute bins 4% 8% 3% 1%
(4%)
60 minute bins 5% 5% 0% 1%
(2%)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
WEEKEND
Notes: Each cell reports the change in call volume across the time threshold for the
respective time window.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  For the 10, 20 and
30 minute bins, the standard errors are computed from observations in the 8 pm to 10 pm
time band.  For the 60 minute bins, the standard errors are computed using the 7 pm to 11
pm band.
CHANGES IN HOURLY CALL VOLUME (MIT), 7PM - 10PM, 2005
WEEKDAY
It is important to note, however, that this sample of callers is unlikely to include many
drivers. Most students and faculty at MIT live near campus, and the campus itself is
situated in close proximity to public transportation. Moreover, the subject pool may not be
20representative of the larger population across a variety of additional dimensions. To address
these concerns, we appeal to a second, much larger, dataset of over 560,000 calls made by
9,907 cell phone users from households across the country in each quarter of 2000 and 2001
(TNS 2001).23 The data was extracted from cellular phone bills voluntarily submitted from
households randomly selected as part of a broader survey of telecommunications behavior
and attitudes.24 While the data includes callers whose plans feature switching thresholds
from 6pm to 10pm, or, in many cases, ambiguous or single tiered pricing, we are able to
infer the time of the switching threshold, if it exists, given that individual calls are labeled
as being "peak" or "o⁄-peak".
From the 9907 callers in the original sample, we retain a subsample of callers that satisfy
each of the following conditions: (1) Callers are in the sample for at least 30 consecutive
days (2) Callers log a minimum of at least 30 calls (incoming and outgoing) (3) Callers
have no calls that are ambiguously tagged (i.e. each call is tagged as either "peak" or
"o⁄-peak" rather than "unclear") (4) Callers have a mix of peak and o⁄-peak calls which
allows us to infer the switching hour of the caller￿ s plan.25 Of the remaining 500 callers
in this subsample, most have plans with switching thresholds at either 7 pm (139), 8 pm
(166) or 9 pm (102).
Figure 5 illustrates the sensitivity of callers in the 7pm, 8pm and 9pm plans to their
particular plan thresholds on weekdays. The ￿gure depicts a relative rise of about 15% for
callers on 7pm plans at 7pm relative to other callers, 25% for callers on 8pm plans at 8pm,
and about 30% for callers on 9pm plans at 9pm. The rise in call volume at each plan￿ s
respective threshold hour is in contrast to the general decline in calls for all other hours
across all the plans over the depicted period.26
23While TNS Telecom continued to harvest cellular phone bills after 2001, we were unable to acquire this
data for a more recent period.
24The "ReQuest Consumer Survey" is a quarterly survey of about 30,000 households on consumer behavior
and attitudes related to telecommunications. It is administered by TNS Telecom and is primarily marketed
to telecom clients to help them better understand consumer attitudes and product preferences. Households
were o⁄ered a small payment in exchange for copies of one month￿ s worth of cellular, cable, TV and internet
bills. In the fourth quarter of 2001, households were o⁄ered $5 and participation in a "special cash prize
ra› e" for their bills.
25We impute the switching hour by computing the change in the average hourly peak/o⁄-peak rating for
each evening hour. Peak calls are tagged with the value "1" while o⁄-peak calls are tagged with the value
"2". In principle, if a caller has a 7 pm switching threshold, then the average peak/o⁄-peak rating should
jump cleanly from 1 to 2 at 7 pm on weekdays. However, due to the presence of holidays or calls made in
excess of the allowed quota for that month, we do not always observe unit jumps in the rating but jumps of
just under 1 unit. Given the absence of clean rating jumps, we tag the evening hour with the largest jump
in average peak/o⁄-peak rating as the switching hour.
26The rationale for the length and call duration requirement is to ensure su¢ cient power for a ￿xed e⁄ects
estimation, as well as to minimize any potential miscategorization of switching time thresholds. The basic























Weekday Call Volume by Plan Switching Time
8pm Plan
Figure 5, Outgoing Hourly Weekday Calls for 7, 8 and 9 pm
























Weekday Call Volume by Plan Switching Time
8pm Plan
Figure 5, Outgoing Hourly Weekday Calls for 7, 8 and 9 pm
Plans in 2000 - 2001
9pm Plan
A panel regression at the level of the individual caller, sizes and con￿rms this sensitivity
of callers to their respective thresholds:
(6) Callsh;s;i = ￿ + ￿Switchs + ￿AfterSwitchh;s;i + ￿h + ￿i + "h;s;i
where Callsh;s;i refers to the total calls made in hour h under a calling plan which switches
to "o⁄-peak" pricing at hour s by caller i. Fixed e⁄ects are included to control for hour
speci￿c variation, as well as for each individual caller. Switchs refers to the hour when a
caller transitions from "peak" to "o⁄-peak" pricing, while AfterSwitchh;s;i denotes hours
after (but not inclusive of) the switching threshold. The regression is estimated for all
weekday outgoing and incoming calls made from 5pm to 12am for those callers included in
the sample.
Table 4 reports that outgoing calls increase by 33.1% at the switching threshold while
incoming calls sustain a smaller, and insigni￿cant, increase of 9.7%. To address the concern
that the rise in calls at the switching threshold may be counteracted by a fall in duration,
the ￿nal column of the table shows that duration is unchanged at the threshold.
22Table 4
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  HOURLY WEEKDAY CALLS & DURATION
POISSON REGRESSION OLS
Outgoing Calls Incoming Duration
(1) (2) (3)
Switching Threshold 1.331*** 1.097 -0.095
(0.102) (0.102) (0.429)




N = 3256 N = 2736 N = 2270
Individual Fixed Effects
CHANGE IN CALL VOLUME AT PLAN THRESHOLD, 2000-2001
Hour Fixed Effects
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
N
Notes: The dependent variable for the first two columns is the number of hourly phone calls
made on weekdays from 2000 - 2001 for callers included in the TNS sample from 5pm to 12am.
Coefficients are presented as incident rate ratios.  The first column presents results of a poisson
regression for all outgoing calls, while the second column estimates the model for incoming
calls.  The switching threshold is a dummy variable which indicates the hour when a caller
transitions from peak to off-peak pricing.  The after switching threshold is a dummy variable
which denotes those hours following (but not inclusive of) the switching hour.  The final column
presents OLS regression results for the link between call duration and switching time thresholds.
Standard errors are robust and clustered by the individual caller.
3.2.3 Change in Crash Rate at Price Discontinuity
Do crash rates respond to the increased cellular usage induced by a change in prices? We
answer this question for both fatal and all crashes by comparing driver behavior at the 9pm
price discontinuity on weekdays during the period characterized by both high cell phone
ownership and high price threshold conformity with such behavior on weekends as well as
a control period preceding the one of interest.
Reporting bias. A well recognized drawback of using a crash database based on
self-reports is the presence of substantive periodic heaping. The trajectory of a fatal crash
record helps to illuminate the origin of this bias in the FARS database of fatal crashes. Once
a fatality linked to a vehicular crash occurs in a given state, it is documented by a variety
of state agencies, and is then translated onto standardized paperwork and inputted into the
FARS database by a trained analyst at a federally sponsored state agency. Consequently,
the actual crash statistics themselves are derived from one of several existing state ￿les such
23as police crash reports, death certi￿cates, or hospital records. Any bias which is likely to
occur, then, may vary in severity across states as well as over time. Figure 6 illustrates
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FATAL CRASH REPORTING BIAS (FARS)
Figure 6, Average FARS Crashes by Minute in 2005
A closer examination of the crash records indicate that over 8% of crashes are reported
to have occurred exactly on the hour. Nearly 27% of crashes are reported to have occurred
either on the hour, half hour, or quarter hour, and 61% of crashes are reported to have
occurred in a minute ending in either 0 or 5. We control ￿ exibly for these biases in
the regression analysis below through three primary strategies. The ￿rst strategy entails
choosing a unit of analysis which is aggregated across multiple minute bins. For example,
if all crashes were reported at the nearest ￿ve minute interval, then the use of ￿fteen minute
bins should be bias free. Consequently we report results for bins of 5, 15 and 30 minutes.
A second strategy is implicit in the double di⁄erencing approach. Assuming no systematic
change of biases across time, then, as the model above outlined, the double di⁄erence across
the pre and post period should mitigate the impact of any reporting bias. Finally we use
￿xed e⁄ects for each minute bin interval which help to control for equivalent biases across
control and treatment periods.
Fatal crashes. We turn ￿rst to the distribution of fatal crashes around the pricing
plan threshold. Again, our estimation draws on variation in such crashes across all EAs
over a 19 year period from 1987 to 2005.
The natural experiment produced by the price discontinuity lends itself to a number of
control comparisons. As outlined above, we test for a link between cellular use and crashes
24by comparing the di⁄erence in crash rates before and after 9pm on weekdays during the
"post" period from 2002 to 2005 to the "pre" period before 1998 when pre-paid plans were
￿rst introduced. As a robustness check, we examine this same double di⁄erence (DD) for
weekends when the pricing thresholds are not in e⁄ect.
Figure 7 illustrates this iterative di⁄erence in crash rates across each of the control
periods. The histograms depict the average number of yearly crashes nationwide for
increasingly larger windows, ranging from 2 to 15 minutes, on both sides of 9pm for both
weekdays and weekends in the "pre" and "post" periods. We exclude crashes reported
as having occurred exactly at 9pm itself to circumvent the considerable on-hour bias in
reporting. Treating each year as an independent draw allows us to calculate standard
errors, which are displayed parenthetically. Surprisingly, the ￿gure indicates a rise in
crashes across the 9pm threshold in all quadrants except that within which the pricing
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Fatal Crashes at 9pm Threshold
Figure 3 depicts time trends in total fatal crashes summed across 20 minute intervals for
weekdays compared to weekends from 8 to 10pm in 2005. The vertical line again marks the
onset of the pricing plan threshold. In contrast to the depiction of call volumes in Figure
2, the plot of crash frequencies do not display any discernible break in weekday crashes
around the 9pm threshold.
We formally estimate the relative change in crashes around 9pm in the period of interest
with the following model:
(7)
crashy;m;d;b = ￿+￿(Post ￿ After 9pm)y;b+￿1After 9pmb+￿2Posty+￿y+￿m+￿d+￿b+"y;m;d;b
where crashy;m;d;b denotes the sum of crashes in year y, month m, day of the week d, and
26in minute bin b. Posty indicates whether the crash occurred during the period of both
high ownership and threshold conformity from 2002 to 2005, and After 9pmb is a dummy
variable indicating whether the crash occurred after 9pm.
The interaction term (Post￿After 9pm)y;b is the explanatory variable of interest. Intu-
itively, our experimental comparison in this regression are di⁄erentials around the threshold
in the "post" period from 2002 to 2005 compared to the same di⁄erential in a control period
preceding 1998. We estimate the model for the years from 1987 to 1998 as well as from
2002 to 2005. Further, we restrict the regression to hours between 7 and 11pm.27 Fixed
e⁄ects for each minute bin control for non-linear movement in crashes across the estimation
period as well as help control for reporting biases.28 The model also includes ￿xed e⁄ects
to control for year, month and day of the week speci￿c variation.
The regression is estimated with a Poisson distribution.29 Table 6 presents the results.
The ￿rst three columns report marginally negative but insigni￿cant point estimates for
the interaction term of interest for the weekday 6pm to 10pm estimation. The fourth
column extends the treatment window to two hours after 9pm. The results indicate no
evidence for a positive increase in crashes, and our favored speci￿cation, reported in the ￿rst
column, implies a upper bound of 2.4%. As a robustness check, the ￿nal column estimates
the double di⁄erence using crashes on weekends rather than weekdays. The higher point
estimate for the weekend provides evidence that a systematic and unobserved change in
the driving environment across the pre and post periods is not masking the estimation
of positive weekday di⁄erentials. Overall, the results provide no evidence for a positive
relative change in fatal crash rates across the threshold.
27Alternatively, we estimate the model for both shorter and longer time bands around 9pm. While the
standard errors are modestly sensitive to the choice of estimation window, the basic results are substantively
unchanged.
28We experimented with other, more granular, controls for the reporting bias. The choice of such controls
does not seem to qualitatively alter the results.
29The estimation choice is dictated by the highly non-normal shape of the crash count distribution. Many
of the year-weekday-minute bin cells contain 0 fatal crashes. A Poisson distribution represents one possible
distributional choice for our count data. Our results are also robust to estimations based on alternative
distributional assumptions (e.g. the linear probability model, and negative binomial regression).
27Table 5
RELATIVE PRE-POST CHANGE IN FATAL CRASH RATE AT 9PM THRESHOLD
DEPENDENT VARIABLE - FATAL CRASHES PER MINUTE BIN
WEEKDAY WEEKEND
6 PM - 10PM 6 PM - 11PM 6 PM - 10PM
5 MN 15 MN 30 MN 5MN 5MN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post x After 9pm -0.0092 -0.0116 -0.0107 -0.0419** 0.0267
(0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.018) (0.030)
After 9pm 0.0308 0.0443* 0.0604*** -0.0284 -0.0021
(0.033) (0.023) (0.017) (0.037) (0.082)
Post -0.0317* -0.0729** -0.0897** -0.0372* -0.0835***
(0.019) (0.035) (0.037) (0.019) (0.030)
Minute Bin Fixed Effects X X X X X
Yr, DOW, Month
Fixed Effects X X X X X
N N = 29846 N = 11364 N = 6093 N = 36914 N = 13374
Notes:  The table presents poisson regression results for the pre (1990-1998) and post (2002-2004) difference in
aggregate fatal crashes for each minute bin on a particular day of the week-month-year.  The first three columns present
the basic specification for weekdays from 6pm to 10pm for 5, 10 and 15 minute bins while column (4) estimates the
model for 6pm to 11pm, and column (5) provides estimates for the weekend.  The After 9pm dummy variable is coded as
1 for any crash occuring after nine 9pm in the estimation period.  Constants and fixed effects are not reported.  All
estimations use robust standard errors and are clustered by day of the week X year.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All Crashes. We turn next to the pattern of all crashes around the pricing plan
threshold. A bene￿t of expanding focus to all crashes is that non-fatal crashes are about
100 times more frequent than their fatal counterparts. A drawback is that, unlike the
FARS dataset, the SDS data of all crashes is limited to seven states in the period ranging
from 1990 to 2004.30 Figure 4 depicts the trend in crashes summed across 20 minute
intervals for weekdays in the "pre" and "post" periods for those states for which data is
available. Once again, no relative break is evident at the threshold.
We again formally test for driver response to the 9pm price discontinuity in the period
of interest through a panel regression. The estimated model is identical to the equation
30For Florida, data is available only until 2002, while for California, Illinois, Missouri and Pennsylvania,
data is available through 2003. Data is available until 2004 for Mexico and Maryland. Illinois reports the
time of crash only beginning in 1996, and Illinois and Pennsylvania did not make crash records available to
the SDS for 2002. There are a total of 55 EAs across the seven states of which 2 were eliminated because
they spanned state borders and problematized county-EA matching. The variability in data availability is
understandable given that the SDS must ultimately rely on each state to provide its own crash records.
28outline above, but with the crashes no longer restricted to just fatal crashes, and the
dependent variable ln(crashy;m;d;b). The model is estimated with an OLS regression for
the period from 7pm to 11pm for the years from 1990 to 1998 and 2002 to 2004.
Table 6 reports the results of the estimation. The table points to a negative double
di⁄erence (Post￿After 9pm)y;b across each of the weekday speci￿cations. The results are
similar to the above estimates for fatal crashes￿the weekday double di⁄erence estimates
for the interaction are non-positive across speci￿cations, and the weekend estimate o⁄ers
no evidence that an unobserved confound is masking a positive e⁄ect. Our favored speci￿-
cation, presented in the ￿rst column, suggests an upper bound for the change in all crashes
of .9%.
Table 6
RELATIVE PRE-POST CHANGE IN ALL CRASH RATE AT 9PM THRESHOLD
DEPENDENT VARIABLE - LN(ALL CRASHES PER MINUTE BIN)
WEEKDAY WEEKEND
6 PM - 10PM 6 PM - 11PM 6 PM - 10PM
5 MN 15 MN 30 MN 5 MN 5 MN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post x After 9pm -0.0244 -0.023 -0.0227 -0.0338 0.0235
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.028) (0.021)
After 9pm -1.519*** -0.897*** -0.571*** -0.412*** -0.0736
(0.019) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.049)
Post -0.164*** -0.175*** 0.345*** -1.916*** -2.015***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.022)
Minute Bin Fixed Effects X X X X X
Yr, DOW, Month
Fixed Effects X X X X X
N N = 34410 N = 11472 N = 5743 N = 43030 N = 13765
Notes:  The table presents OLS regression results for the pre (1990-1998) and post (2002-2004) difference in ln(all
crashes) data aggregated across the seven states for which data is available for each minute bin on a particular day of
the week-month-year.  The first three columns present the basic specification for weekdays from 6pm to 10pm for 5, 10
and 15 minute bins while column (4) estimates the model for 6pm to 11pm, and column (5) provides estimates for the
weekend.  after having eliminated crashes reported on each hour.  The After 9pm dummy variable indicates any crash
occuring after nine 9pm in the estimation period.  Constants and fixed effects are not reported.  All estimations use
robust standard errors and are clustered by day of the week X year.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
In summary, the 9pm pricing analysis provides upper bounds of the relative change in
fatal crashes of about 2.4% and an upper bound of .9% for all crashes. This upper bound
29compares to the 4% increase that one would expect to see given the RT estimate of a 4.3
fold increase in relative crash risk, a baseline driver cell phone usage of 10%, and the 16%
discontinuity in call volume at the threshold implied by the MIT data. We comment on
the implications of these estimates further in the discussion below.
While the pricing discontinuity provides a relatively clean research design, one drawback
of this natural experiment is that it produces only a local average treatment e⁄ect of the
increase in crash rates around weekdays at 9pm. Moreover, the estimated behavioral
response at 9pm is prompted by changes in cellular usage rather than changes in cell phone
ownership. To address these concerns, we provide an additional set of analyses in the next
section.
3.3 Additional Analyses
A series of additional empirical approaches con￿rm our basic results. In the ￿rst approach,
we compare aggregate national trends in crashes and cellular ownership at the EA level.
Each EA consists of one or more economic nodes - a metropolitan or micropolitan statistical
area that serves as a regional economic center. The 172 EAs identi￿ed by the BEA range
in population from 61,285 (North Platte, Nebraska) to 25 million (the EA spanning New
York City, Northern New Jersey and Long Island). EAs represent a greater level of
disaggregation than data at the state (or national) level, and, as such, are closer to the
ideal for this type of analysis. We then exploit implied di⁄erences in cellular ownership
in predominantly urban versus rural counties within each EA, as an even more precise test
of the link between ownership and crashes. Finally, using a state-month panel design, we
examine whether complete legislative bans on driver cell phone use in a number of states
have had any impact on reducing the fatal crash rate.
3.3.1 Aggregate Trends in Crashes and Cell Phone Ownership
A basic test of whether cell phone use causes crashes is to compare the change in cell phone
ownership with the change in the rate of crashes across time. Figure 1 jointly depicts
the trend in cellular ownership with the trends in tra¢ c adjusted fatal and all crashes.
If anything, the ￿gure hints at a negative correlation between the two series. Such a
negative correlation would be even more pronounced if changes in cell phone usage per
month, depicted in Figure A1, were additionally considered.
However, given that the rise in cell phone ownership across regions is su¢ ciently het-
erogeneous, we can exploit variation across regions as well as years to more accurately pin
down the link between cellular ownership and crashes. Indeed, EAs are associated with
considerable variation in ownership. Ownership rates ranged from 19 to 57% across the
30EAs in 2001. By 2005, this range grew to 41 to 95% ownership. Accordingly, we estimate
the following model with OLS:
ln(Crash)r;y = ￿ + ￿Cell Ownr;y + ￿V olr;y + ￿1r + ￿2y + "r;y
where ln(Crashr;y) denotes the log of crashes for region r and year y, while Cell Ownr;y
refers to cell phone ownership in percent terms for region r and year y. The model also
includes ￿xed e⁄ects to control for region and year speci￿c variation as well as more ￿ exible
controls for region speci￿c linear and quadratic time trends. As a robustness check, we
include one speci￿cation which has an additional control, V olr;y, for tra¢ c volume across
region and year. All estimations are conducted at the EA level, with the exception of the
robustness speci￿cation which is estimated at the state-level.
Table 7 presents the results of the estimation for both fatal and all crash data. The
￿rst two columns provide estimations for the universe of fatal crashes for all 172 EAs from
1987 to 2005 for all states. Since cellular ownership is only observed from 2001 to 2005, we
code it as missing from 1993 to 2000, and assume it be zero prior to 1993. This strategy
allows us to e⁄ectively construct a control period with zero ownership and contrast it with
the period for which ownership is both positive and known. The ￿rst column reports the
estimated percent change in the fatal crash rate given a 1% point increase in cell phone
ownership in a representative EA after controlling for EA and year ￿xed e⁄ects. The next
column includes more ￿ exible controls which allow for EA speci￿c time trends. Columns
(3) and (4) repeat the exercise for all crashes for the six states for which data is available.
The point estimates in these speci￿cations fail to suggest a link between ownership and
fatal crashes, and if anything, suggest a marginally negative relationship.
The ￿nal column includes a regression of fatal accidents controlling for state-year high-
way volume and provides an important robustness check of the results. This regressions
is limited to fatal accidents at the state, rather than the EA, level.31 Changes in tra¢ c
volume over time and region do not seem to alter the earlier results.
Given the favored speci￿cation for all crashes, in column (4), our estimation allows us
to reject any e⁄ect size larger than -.0032 + 1.96*.0031 = .0029. That is, we can place the
upper bound of the e⁄ect on the all crash rate of a 1% point increase in cellular ownership
at .29% given a 95% con￿dence interval. With current ownership at 75%, a simple linear
extrapolation then suggests that the introduction of cellular technology has caused no more
than a 22% increase in all crashes compared to the counterfactual scenario in which cell
phones were never used. An analogous calculation, using the regression result for fatal
31Tra¢ c is coded at the state level. Regressions are con￿ned to fatal accidents since the limited number of
states in the SDS dataset precludes including all crashes in the estimation.As opposed to EA level penetration
which is available only since 2001, state level ownership data is available since 1999.
31Table 7
TRENDS IN CELLULAR OWNERSHIP AND CRASHES ACROSS REGION-YEAR
DEPENDENT VARIABLE - LN(CRASHES PER 100,000 POP)
Fatal Crashes (FARS) All Crashes (SDS) Fatal Crashes
Economic Area Economic Area State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.0010 -0.0004 -0.0018 -0.0032 -0.1274
(0.0013) (0.0002) (0.0024) (0.0031) (0.3948)
ln(Traffic Volume) 0.3978
(0.2803)
X X X X X
X X X X X
X X X
X X X
N = 1361 N = 1361 N = 315 N = 315 N = 540
0.86 0.93 0.96 0.99 1.00




Region FE x Year
2
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
R
2
Notes: The dependent variable of this OLS regression is the natural log of the number of crashes in a given year for a
particular region from 1987 to 2005 for fatal crashes, and from 1990 to 2004 for all crashes.  For the first two columns,
crashes are confined to fatal crashes, while the next two columns report all crash data.  The explanatory variable of interest is
the rate of cell phone ownership (i.e. cell phone subscribers / population) for the corresponding year and region.  Constants
are excluded.  All estimations use robust standard errors and are clustered by EA.
N
crashes in column (2), suggests that the introduction of cell phones did not cause any
increase in fatal crashes as compared to the counterfactual.32
There are multiple plausible explanations for why our estimations do not yield signi￿cant
results. One, of course, is the absence of any genuine correlation between crashes and
cellular ownership. A second possibility is that there are unobserved variables which are
correlated with the growth in cell phone ownership across regions and time. The likelihood
for this bias in results is more pronounced given the lack of EA level ownership data before
2001. A ￿nal possibility is that our test lacks power to detect the size of the true e⁄ect.
The lack of precision in our all crash estimates can partially be attributed to the high
32These upper bounds neglect the dramatic rise in cell phone usage per subscriber in recent years, as well
as the increase in usage of cell phones speci￿cally by drivers. For example, the FCC reports that cell phone
use per subscriber has risen from 140 to 740 minutes per month from 1993 to 2005. If one were to weight
yearly ownership by usage by subscriber, then our estimates of e⁄ect size bounds might be even lower.
32level of aggregation of our unit of analysis. Though the EA represents the most disaggre-
gated level for which subscription data is widely available, our analysis ignores the potential
variation of cell phone ownership within a given Economic Area. Given systematic histor-
ical di⁄erences in ownership across rural and urban areas, one strategy through which to
engage this variation, is to infer county speci￿c cellular ownership through the rural/urban
character of each county. We turn to this analysis next.
3.3.2 Crashes & Urban/Rural Variation in Coverage
One drawback of the region-year regressions is that cellular ownership and crashes are
compared at a high level of aggregation. This aggregation introduces imprecision in the
estimated correlation between the two trends. As an alternative, more precise, estimation
strategy, we exploit the heterogeneity in the spread of cellular coverage in urban as compared
to rural areas. We ￿nd no additional evidence for a link between vehicle crashes and cell
phone ownership.
Urban/Rural Coverage Gap. Policy makers have long recognized the existence
of an urban-rural gap in telecommunications infrastructure. The Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) ￿rst explicitly addressed urban-rural di⁄erences in cellular service
provision in its annual report in 2002 (FCC 2002). The organization assessed competi-
tive di⁄erences between urban and rural markets using a variety of classi￿cation schemes
through which they distinguished urban from rural areas.33 Based on their analysis, the
FCC has consistently concluded that rural consumers have far less choice in providers￿and
therefore inferior coverage￿than their urban counterparts.
There have been attempts to redress this urban-rural imbalance. Most prominent
amongst such e⁄orts is the Universal Service Fund (USF) which levies a tax on all interstate
and international telecommunications providers to fund telecommunications infrastructure
in rural areas. Between 2000 and 2005, the USF increased spending from $1.8 billion to $3.8
billion on programs to subsidize capital and operating costs for telecommunications service
provision in rural areas. Much of that increase was earmarked to rural wireless providers.
Despite these gains, rural areas still tend to be characterized by less provider choice, more
dead zones and worse service quality. Such factors cause￿or perhaps re￿ ect￿the lower
ownership levels found in rural as opposed to urban populations. At least in the early
years of cell phone technology, the marginal urban consumer has been more pro￿table to
serve than her rural counterpart.34
33These classi￿cation schemes included "Cellular Market Areas" (i.e. "Metropolitan Statistical Areas" vs
"Rural Service Areas"), population density, and "Economic Area nodal" versus "Economic Area non-nodal"
counties. The FCC reports clearly state, however, that, ￿The FCC does not have a statutory de￿nition of
what constitutes a rural area."
34A news article in the USA Today highlights some of the concerns of rural consumers and the factors
33The intuition underlying the analysis in this section is that trends in the urban-rural
gap in cellular ownership should be at least partly mirrored by trends in the urban-rural
di⁄erentials in crash rates if cell phone usage impacts driving safety. Unfortunately, precise
measures of the urban-rural gap are di¢ cult to locate. The challenge is that ownership
data is not separately available for rural and urban areas.35 However, we are able to
con￿rm the suggested evidence of lagging rural ownership using an indirect approach.
Since the most disaggregated subscription data is available at the level of the EA, a
￿rst step in assessing urban-rural ownership is to identify the urban-rural character of each
EA. Accordingly, counties in the US are often classi￿ed along a urban-rural continuum
depending on the size of the urban population and proximity to a metro area.36 Appendix
Table A2 enumerates the nine categories of counties on the urban-rural continuum and
also displays the distribution of counties and population across these categories in the year
2000.
From these county level classi￿cations, we generate two measures of EA urban-rural
character. The ￿rst is the population-weighted average of the urban rural continuum codes
of the counties in each EA. The second is the distribution of the EA population across the
nine county types. Figure 10 presents an EA level scatter plot of cellular ownership against
the fraction of the EA population that resides in metropolitan counties (corresponding to
codes 1 to 3) in 2001￿the ￿rst year for which EA level ownership data is available. The
￿gure illustrates that metropolitan EAs tend to have higher levels of cellular ownership.
determining choice of cell tower location in rural markets (Davidson, USA Today, December 20th, 2005).
35Since 2001, the FCC has been collecting subscription data at a far more disaggregated geographical
level - the so-called rate centers. Rate centers are small geographical areas used by local carriers for a
number of purposes including toll determination. Urban rate centers are usually a few square miles while
very rural areas have rate centers encompassing hundreds of square miles. All service providers must report
total number of subscribers at the rate center level to the Number Resource Utilization/Forecast (NRUF)
database. There are 18,000 rate centers or on average 6 per county. This detailed data are not available to
the authors.
36This coding scheme was originated in 1975 by David L. Brown, Fred K. Hines, and John M. Zimmer for
a report Social and Economic Characteristics of the Population in Metro and Nonmetro Counties: 1970. It
was updated after both the 1980 and 1990 censuses. The current coding is from 2003 and is similar in spirit
to the earlier approach. However, in the 2000 census there were major changes to delineating metro areas
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To test this relationship more formally, Table A4 in the Appendix presents the results
of EA level regressions of the change in ownership ￿rst from 1992 to 2001 and then from
2001 to 2005, on the two measures of urban-rural character.37 The results con￿rm the
graphical intuition that cellular ownership was lagging in more rural EAs as of 2001. On
average, cell phone ownership was -1.9% points lower for every 1 point increase in the EA
average urban-rural continuum code in the period prior to 2001. This translates into a
di⁄erence of about 14% in cell phone ownership between the most urbanized and the most
rural of EAs in 2001.38 The analogous estimate for the change in ownership from 2001 to
2005 is negative but insigni￿cant. If rural areas narrowed the ownership divide during that
period, one would expect positive coe¢ cients on rural markers. If anything, the results of
the regressions suggests that the most urban counties made further gains relative to their
counterparts from 2001 to 2005.
Vehicular Crashes & Urban/Rural Character. Next we turn to trends in the
urban-rural di⁄erential in fatal and non-fatal vehicular crashes during the period of high
cellular ownership. We classify fatal crashes as occurring in either metro, urban, or rural
counties using the urban-rural continuum codes. Since rural ownership lags urban owner-
ship within an EA, we expect ownership levels to be decreasing in the urban-rural continuum
codes. Consequently, within an EA, the more urban counties should have a higher level
37This change is equivalent to the level of penetration in 2001 given the assumed 0% penetration in 1992.
38The regression also suggests that penetration in 2001 is strongly correlated with the population share
of the major metropolitan counties ￿ that is, a 1% increase in the metro population share of an EA is
associated with a 0.14% increase in cell phone ownership.
35of cellular ownership than suggested by their EA average, while the most rural counties
should have ownership levels lower than that indicated by their EA average. For ease of
exposition, we aggregate counties into three groups. Counties with urban rural continuum
codes 1-3, 4-7, and 8-9 in 2000 are grouped as metropolitan, urban/suburban, and rural
areas respectively.39
To test the relationship between county type and crashes, we regress county fatal crash
rates on EA level ownership as well as its interaction with the county type t:




Table 8 presents the results of the OLS regressions. If increasing cellular ownership has
a su¢ ciently large impact on fatal crashes, one would expect the metropolitan crash rate
to rise relative to the rural rate. While crashes in rural areas are far less common than in
more populous urban and suburban areas, rural crashes are actually more likely to be fatal
because such crashes involve higher average speeds, fewer average safety restraints, and
relative delays in the arrival of medical care40. The ￿rst three columns provide estimation
results for fatal crashes, while the remaining columns provide results for all crashes. Fixed
e⁄ects and EA speci￿c linear and quadratic time trends are used to control for possible
confounds.
The ￿rst column con￿rms the large di⁄erences in levels across the three county types.
On average, urban/suburban and rural counties have fatal crash rates 31% and 68% higher
than that of metropolitan counties. The second and third columns indicate that higher
EA-level ownership is associated with a reduction in the fatal crash rate in metropolitan
counties. Within an EA ownership is decreasing across the urban-rural continuum. Because
the dummy variables are coded with the metro county type as the base case, if cellular
ownership is linked to the fatal crash rate, then one would expect negative coe¢ cients on
the interactions terms (urban￿cell own) and (rural￿cell own). Yet, relative to the e⁄ect
of increasing ownership for metropolitan counties, there is an increase in the urban crash
rate, and no signi￿cant di⁄erence for rural counties. A F-test on the joint signi￿cance
of cellular ownership and its interaction with county type yields an F-statistic of 29.9,
indicating signi￿cance at the 1% level. These results are robust to the inclusion of linear
and quadratic time trends across the three county types. While the results are clearly
39We have run the analyses at a more disaggregate level - using the 1 to 9 urban rural continuum code -
and the results remain substantively similar.
40There is the intriguing possibility that the spread of cell phones may actually help reduce crash fatalities
especially in rural areas if crash victims or passing motorists are able to summon medical assistance more
promptly.
36inconsistent with a simple story of increasing cellular ownership leading to increasing fatal
crash rates, they could be indicative of heterogeneous treatment e⁄ects within county types.
It is unclear, however, why such heterogeneity would exist.
Columns (4-6) present results from the same speci￿cations using the SDS data for all
crashes for seven states from 1990 to 2004. Column (4) indicates that the level of all crashes
is lower in rural as opposed to metro areas. The ￿nal two columns indicate a small negative
e⁄ect of ownership on metropolitan crash rates, but the interaction terms again o⁄er no
evidence for a di⁄erential e⁄ect on crashes across urban and rural counties. An F-test on
the joint signi￿cance of cellular ownership and its interaction with county type yields an
F-statistic of 1.39 which is insigni￿cant at the 10% level. These results are robust to the
inclusion of ￿ exible time trends across the county types. In summary, there appears to
be no evidence of di⁄erential trends in urban-rural crash rates linked to increasing cellular
ownership.
3.3.3 Legislative Ban on Cell Phones & Crashes
In our ￿nal approach, we estimate the impact of legislative bans which restrict cellular
use by drivers. Three states have legislated complete bans on hand-held phones: New
York was the ￿rst in November of 2001, followed by New Jersey in July 2004, and then
Connecticut in October 2005. Beyond these states, a number of municipalities have also
enacted complete bans. The largest of these municipalities are Washington D.C. which
enacted a complete ban in July 2004, and Chicago, Illinois whose ban took e⁄ect in July
of 2005. Six additional states have legislated partial bans on driver cellular use, but each
of these bans targeted a modest fraction of drivers (Table A5 in the Appendix enumerates
the states and large municipalities with complete or partial bans).41
Figure 9 reports the raw monthly counts of fatal crashes for the months preceding
and following the enactment of each complete ban for the ￿ve relevant regions. The
series for Connecticut and Chicago are truncated due to the relatively recent imposition
of their respective bans. The ￿gure indicates no apparent drop in crashes for any of the
regions during the month immediately following the ban (t+1) as compared to the month
immediately preceding the ban (t ￿ 1). An examination of longer horizons reveals no
signi￿cant dip in crashes for any region other than, at ￿rst glance, the state of New York.
However, we attribute the drop in crashes in New York at least partially to the attacks on
September 11th, 2001, as opposed to the imposition of the legislative restrictions. In fact,
41Chicago is the largest municipality to enact a complete ban against driver cell phone use. Other
smaller municipalities have also enacted bans. However, of these bans, many are subject to minimal
enforcement. An enumeration of municipalities with bans can be found in the "Phones and Highway
Safety: 2005 Legislative Update" published by the National Conference of State Legislatures (available at:
www.ncsl.org/programs/transportation/cellphoneupdate05.htm#stateCell)
37Table 8
LINK BETWEEN CRASHES AND URBAN/RURAL CHARACTER
DEPENDENT VARIABLE - LN(CRASHES PER 100,000 POP)
Fatal Crashes (FARS) All Crashes (SDS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.3134*** 0.3306*** 0.3094*** 0.0390 0.0234 0.1370**
(0.0254) (0.0332) (0.0378) (0.0419) (0.0735) (0.0548)
0.6776*** 0.5898*** 0.6818*** -0.2004*** -0.2518** -0.2243***
(0.0428) (0.0779) (0.0678) (0.0613) (0.1023) (0.0821)
-0.0019*** -0.0019*** -0.0008* -0.0008*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004)
0.0053*** 0.0055*** 0.0005 -0.0012
(0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0027)
0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0011
(0.0030) (0.0040) (0.0047) (0.0057)
X X X X X X
X X X X X X
X X X X
X X
N = 46758 N = 23226 N = 23226 N = 6345 N = 2617 N = 2617
0.31 0..32 0.32 0.48 0.50 0.50








EA Fixed Effects x Year
2
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
R
2
Notes:  The dependent variable for the first three columns is the natural log of the number of fatal crashes per 100,000 in population in
a given year for a particular Economic Area.  For the next three columns the dependent variable is the per capita log of all crashes for
EAs in SDS states.  Counties with urban-rural continuum codes of <= 3, 4 to 7, and >= 8 are respectively designated as metro,
urban/suburban and rural.  All errors are robust and clustered at the EA level.
N
the New York legislation, while nominally enacted in November of 2001, was not enforced
with binding ￿nes until March of 2002 which corresponds to (t + 4) in the ￿gure.
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In order to control for possible confounds in crash patterns during this period, we
estimate the following Poisson regression at the EA level for fatal crashes from 2000 to
2005:
(9) Crashr;m;y = ￿ + ￿Banr;m;y + ￿r + ￿m + ￿y + "r;m;y
where Banr;m;y is a dummy variable which indicates that a complete ban was in e⁄ect for
any part of a given EA r in month m, and year y. Month, year, and EA ￿xed e⁄ects were
included along with linear time trends by EA to ￿ exibly control for time and region speci￿c
variation in crashes. The results of the estimated coe¢ cient b ￿ (1.38%, p=.93) con￿rms the
general intuition of Figure 9￿ legislative bans on cellular use do not seem to reduce fatal
crash counts.
4 Discussion
The present analysis implies lower crash rates than suggested by popular or academic
belief. Table 9 enumerates the absolute risk rates for aggregate crashes implied by the RT
study￿the most widely cited study on cellular use and relative crash risk￿under varying
assumptions of cell phone usage by drivers, as well as the estimates of call volume increase
produced by our two ￿rst stage data sets. For example, using the 2006 NOPUS estimate
of handheld and handsfree driver cell phone use of 10%, and the estimatde call volume
39increase from 9 to 10pm of 16% from the MIT sample, the 4.3 fold increase in relative crash
risk of RT implies a 4% relative increase in crashes during the hour following the weekday
9pm threshold.
Since the TNS sample is larger and more representative than the MIT sample, the
rise in call volume is arguably closer to 33% than to 16%. A key assumption relates to
cellphone usage during nighttime driving. However, we were unable to ￿nd any accurate
and recent assessments. The NOPUS estimate of 10% cellular usage was conducted during
the day. The only nighttime assessment of cell phone usage, the 1.5% estimate of drivers
on the NJ Turnpike, was published in 2004, but relied on data collected between March
and July of 2001 and focused explicitly on drivers on high speed roadways (Johnson et.
al. 2004). As such, the estimates are from a period with minimal cellular ownership, and
near-zero hands-free usage.42 It is reasonable then to assume that nighttime usage may
be lower than the daytime NOPUS ￿gure of 10% although interestingly the NJ Turnpike
study found no signi￿cant di⁄erence between afternoon and nighttime usage. Yet it is also
likely that combined usage (handheld and handsfree) during the late evening hours in 2005
is well above 1.5%.
Our most convincing evidence suggests that cellular use does not increase crash risk.
That is, point estimates for the increase in both fatal and all crashes are approximately
0 across speci￿cations. In this sense, the ￿ndings of this paper are more consistent with
the trends of Figure 1 than that of the estimates produced by RT. In fact, for all but
implausibly low ranges of possible cell phone use, the upper bounds of our estimates for
all crashes fall below the RT estimates. Given the lower frequency of fatal crashes, the
resulting standard errors, as well as upper bounds, of the estimation are higher than for
the all crash analysis. Nevertheless, the upper bound of 2.4% for the fatal crash rate still
falls below most plausible RT estimates.
42Note that the NOPUS estimates of cellular usage doubled from 2000 (3%) to 2005 (6%), and was 4%
in 2002.
40Table 9
COMPARISON OF 9PM % CRASH INCREASE IMPLIED BY




Driving Time on Cell Phone Fatal All
1.5% 4% 7% 10%
9pm Call Volume Rise
16% (MIT) 0.8 1.9 3.0 4.0 2.4 0.9
33% (TNS) 1.6 3.8 6.2 8.2 2.4 0.9
Notes: This table presents the increase in aggregate crash risk due to driver cell phone use implied by the RT (1997) study
as compared to the present study.  The table reports the risk increase implied by varying estimates of driver cell phone use,
as well as the estimates of call volume increase from 9pm to 10pm indicated by the two first stage samples.  The mean RT
relative crash risk estimate of 4.3 was used to calculate the figures.
An important caveat of our analysis is that the estimated e⁄ects represent a local treat-
ment e⁄ect. That is, while our research design allows for a relatively precise estimation
of the driver response at 9pm on weekdays after 2002, mappings to an absolute crash risk
presume that the local average treatment e⁄ect is in fact the average treatment e⁄ect. One
way through which we dealt with the issue of generalizability is to examine aggregate EA
level trends in both ownership and crashes as well as urban-rural di⁄erentials in crashes.
While these analysis provide directional support for a zero e⁄ect, they su⁄er from greater
imprecision than that produced from the natural experiment. Importantly, the analysis
reveals no salutary e⁄ect of existing state-wide cell phone bans. Additionally, we do not
estimate the rise in call volume exclusively for drivers. It is possible that driver sensitivity
to the 9pm price threshold is less than that of non-drivers. However, the rise in cell phone
usage amongst drivers at the threshold would have to be quite modest for the upper bounds
of our analysis for all crashes to fall below the RT estimates.
What might then explain the departure of our results from that of RT? As mentioned
earlier, the RT study, inventive as it was, su⁄ers from two principle drawbacks. The
￿rst is that it relies on an unrepresentative sample of those involved in a recent crash.
Additionally, there is the possibility that the RT result is driven by a confound such as
driver anxiety which prompts both cellular use as well as higher crash risk. Our study
41for the most part avoids these problems. Finally, it is possible that the ￿ndings of RT,
generated in 1997, may no longer apply to the seasoned cell phone drivers of recent years.
More recent studies, however, have very closely replicated the RT results (McEvoy et. al.
2005). We turn next to the mechanisms which might explain the absence of a correlation
between crashes and cellular use.
Interpreting the E⁄ect Magnitude. If cell phones are a source of distraction, given
limits to attentional capacity, how is it that our estimates suggest that such phones have
zero, or perhaps even a mitigating, in￿ uence on crashes? Indeed, there are a number of
plausible explanations for why cell phone use may appear to reduce rather than raise crash
frequency.
One explanation is that drivers who use cell phones compensate for the added distrac-
tion by modifying their driving behavior. This so called ￿Peltzman E⁄ect￿was popularized
by Sam Peltzman who suggested that the bene￿ts of seat-belt regulations might be o⁄set
by the riskier driving of those who substituted one form of risk for another (1975). While
compensatory responses to the imposition of seat-belts may seem far-fetched, it is more
plausible to imagine drivers who slow down, pull over, shift to uncongested lanes or road-
ways, or simply allocate more attention to driving in response to making or receiving a cell
phone call.
A second, related, possibility is that the drivers who tend to use cell phones while driving
are drivers who have an a¢ nity for riskiness. In this scenario, risk loving drivers simply
use cell phones as a substitute for other distractions (e.g. talking to a fellow passenger, or
￿ddling with their radios). Hahn and Prieger present a model for such behavior, as well as
survey evidence which suggests that driver heterogeneity in riskiness has led most research
to signi￿cantly overestimate the impact of cell phone use on crashes (2006). Much like our
study, they conclude that driver use of cell phones has close to a zero e⁄ect on crashes.
A third possibility is that cell phones actually improve driver outcomes for some drivers
by alleviating boredom. The NHTSA reports that 100,000 crashes, and 1500 fatal crashes
each year are attributable to driver fatigue or sleepiness (NHTSA 2004). "The 100-Car
Naturalistic Study" concluded that 20% of crashes and 12% of near-crashes were linked to
driver fatigue (NHTSA 2006a). The dangers of fatigue may be particularly pronounced
for drivers accustomed to driving long distances or long hours such as large truck or cab
drivers. In 2003, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration implicated fatigue as
a factor in 13% of all fatal large-truck crashes.43 It is possible that for a certain class of
drivers, cell phone use actually reduces fatigue and leads to safer outcomes.
Finally, the e⁄ect of cellular use on crashes may be heterogeneous across drivers. That
is, while the local average treatment e⁄ect may be marginally negative or zero, there may
43Reported as a part of the Report to Congress on the Large Truck Crash Causation.
42be drivers for whom the use of cell phones is particularly detrimental, as well as some
drivers for whom the e⁄ect is negligible or even bene￿cial. Since our estimation does not
distinguish between di⁄erent driver types, our results could be masking the variation in the
dangers of cell phone use that is evident in some of the experimental results. One possible
direction of future research is to explore the potential heterogeneity of this e⁄ect.
Implications for Welfare & Policy. Incontestably, cell phones provide economic
value to drivers. Driver use of cell phones has been increasing over the years, and there is
some evidence that such use continues even in spite of explicit regulations. The Harvard
Center for Risk Analysis pegged the value of non-emergency cellular calls by drivers at $43
billion annually (Lissy et. al. 2000). Yet, despite the transparent bene￿ts, a majority of
Americans support bans of driver cell phone use and view such devices as a leading threat
to public safety (Gallup 2003). A large number of municipalities, every state in the nation,
as well as Congress itself has either considered or passed legislation against driver use of
cell phones during the last several years.
In light of the bene￿ts of cellular devices, our results suggest that such bans on all
cellular use may not be economically e¢ cient. However, given that our results do not rule
out heterogeneity in the riskiness of cell phones across driver type, then bans on certain
demographics, or bans on cellular use in certain contexts may indeed be worthwhile. Bans
of cell phone use by teenagers in a number of states suggests that policy makers believe
in such heterogeneity in risk (AAA 2007). More research should be done to elucidate the
subpopulations of drivers for whom the link to crashes may indeed be relatively high.
Moreover, policies aimed at regulating cellular usage while driving trade o⁄ the value
to society of unfettered cell phone use against the risk to life, limb and property. As such,
the estimates of our paper could then be used to make explicit the statistical value of life
which is implicit in such policies and could further inform cost-bene￿t analyses of the same
(see Kniesner and Viscusi 2003, Johansson 2002 for discussion of the statistical value of life
implied by regulatory decisions).
5 Conclusion
The link between cell phone use and driver safety has emerged in recent years as a topic
of considerable research and policy interest. Most studies have concluded that cell phone
usage increases crash risk with some even comparing its danger to that of alcohol consump-
tion. The most notable of these studies (RT) suggest that cell phones result in a four fold
increase in relative crash risk. Policy makers in several states have responded by pushing
through either partial or complete bans on cell phones while driving.
We investigate the link between driver phone use and crash rates by exploiting a natural
43experiment induced by a discontinuity in pricing in popular cell phone plans. We ￿rst
document a jump in call volume immediately after 9 pm on weekdays￿when most plans
since 2002 allow for free calls￿using two large, distinct set of call level data. No such jump
occurs on the weekend. Given call sensitivity to the change in marginal prices, we then
examine the corresponding change in crash rates around the 9pm threshold since 2002. In
order to control for possible confounds, we compare the change in crashes around 9pm to
the same change in the period prior to the introduction of pre-paid plans in 1998, as well as
to weekends. While the RT results imply an approximately 1 to 8% rise in crashes across
the pricing threshold, we ￿nd no evidence for a relative rise in crash rates. In fact, the
upper bounds of our estimates allow us to rule out any rise in fatal crashes larger than 2.4%
and any rise in all crashes larger than .9%. To corroborate our results, we pursue three
additional empirical strategies. None of these provide evidence to support a link between
crash rates and driver cell phone use.
Reconciling our ￿ndings with that of the 4.3 fold increase in relative crash risk observed
by RT presents a challenge. However, a few hypotheses exist. Drivers for whom cell
phones greatly increases the risk of a crash may be overrepresented in the RT sample. Such
selection e⁄ects suggest that the RT result is at best an upper bound for the population of
drivers as a whole. Further, risk loving drivers may simply treat cell phones as a substitute
for other distractions (e.g. talking to a fellow passenger, or ￿ddling with their radios) (Hahn
and Prieger 2006).
It is important to note, however, that this research does not imply that cell phone use
is innocuous. It simply implies that current cellular use by drivers does not appear to
cause a rise in crashes. It could be that drivers who use such devices compensate for
the added distraction by driving more carefully. This hypothesis is consistent with the
theory put forth by Peltzman (1975). In the least, we believe that these ￿ndings should
renew interest in empirical research examining the e⁄ects of cell phone use, and possibly
reopen policy discussions on the costs and bene￿ts of regulations where such dialogue has
quieted. One direction of future research which may prove particularly important to policy
makers involves examining whether the in￿ uence of cellular use di⁄ers across drivers and
contexts. Our research design allows for such an analysis of driver heterogeneity if one
uses di⁄erences in cell phone price sensitivity across demographic groups as an additional
source of treatment variation.
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SUMMARY OF DATA SOURCES
DATA SOURCE YEARS DESCRIPTION
(1) (2) (3)
Fatal Crashes Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) 1987 - 2005 Crash records for all fatal crashes for all 50 states
All Crashes State Data System (SDS) 1990 - 2004 Crash records for all crashes for seven states
Traffic Federal Highway Administration 1987 - 2005 Traffic volume by county by year
Cellular Subscribers Cellular Telephone Industry Association Survey (CTIA) 1999 - 2005 Cellular subscribers by state by year
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 2001 - 2005 Cellular subscribers by Economic Area (EA)
Population Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 1987 - 2005 Yearly population by county
EA - County Codes The Bureau of Economic Analysis 2000 EA codes for each county
Reality Mining Project, MIT 2005
Logs tracking ~80,000 outgoing cellular calls for
60
TNS Telecom 2000 - 2001
Data from cellular phone bills for 9000+
households
Provider Pricing Plans Econ One Research 2001 - 2005
Historical pricing plan details for all providers
offering plans in NYC
Provider Market Shares S&P Industry Reports 1999 - 2005 Market shares by provider by year
United States Census 1990 - 2005 Population density by county







BY ECONOMIC AREA (EA)
N MEAN MIN MAX MED
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
in Millions
172 1.45 0.06 23.95 0.63
(2.60)
172 1.72 0.06 26.38 0.76
(3.01)
% share of Population
2001 168 40.2 19 57 40.5
(7.2)
2005 169 68 41 95 67
(10.2)
rate per 100,000
1990 172 19.4 9.4 40.0 18.7
(5.7)
2005 172 17.4 7.0 44.3 16.2
(6.3)
rate per 100,000
1990 55 2239 1013 4294 2105
(921.2)









50DESCRIPTION NUMBER % POP
(1) (2) (3)
Counties in metro areas of 1 million in population or more 413 0.53
Counties in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million in population 325 0.20
Counties in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 in population 351 0.10
Urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area 218 0.05
Urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area 105 0.02
Urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area 609 0.05
Urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area 450 0.03
Completely rural or less than 2,500 in urban population, adjacent to a metro area 235 0.01













51CHANGE IN % CELLULAR OWNERSHIP
1992 - 2001 2001 - 2005






















2 0.17 0.27 0.01 0.08
N = 168 N = 168 N = 172 N = 172
CELLULAR OWNERSHIP & URBAN/RURAL CHARACTER
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
N
Notes: Penetration refers to number of subscribers for every 100 in population.  EA rural code refers to
the county average urban/rural continuum code weighted by population for an EA in year 2000.  More
rural EAs are assigned higher value types.
% Pop - County Type 9
Table A4
% Pop - County Type 8
EA Rural Code (Type)
% Pop - County Type 1
% Pop - County Type 2
% Pop - County Type 3
% Pop - County Type 4
% Pop - County Type 5
% Pop - County Type 6
% Pop - County Type 7
52SUMMARY OF STATE BANS ON CELL PHONES
STATES DATE OF ENACTMENT SCOPE OF BAN PUNISHMENT
Connecticut Oct 2005 Complete $100 fine
New Jersey July 2004 Complete Secondarily enforced, fines from $100-250
New York Nov 2001* Complete $100 fine
Washington D.C. July 2004 Complete $100 fine (first offense waivable)
Illinois Complete ban for Chicago
Colorado Ban on permit drivers Secondarily enforced, fine of $15
Deleware Ban on permit drivers Similar to reckless driving penalties
Maine Ban on permit drivers No penalty specified
Maryland Ban on permit drivers License may be suspended for up to 90 days
Minnesota Ban on permit drivers License may be restricted
Texas Ban on permit drivers* Not Available
NOTE. Table compiled from National Conference of State Legislatures reports, as well as various other news sources.  New York law was enacted in November
2001, but fines were not fully binding until March 2002.  In New Jersey and Colorado, cell phone use is ticketed only in combination with some other violation.
California has also passed a state-wide ban on handheld cellular usage, but the ban will not go into effect until July of 2008.  The Texas ban on permit drivers
applies to drivers only for the first six months following the issuance of a permit.
Table A5
Usage









































































































































































Figure A2, Outgoing Calls from 12pm – 12am in 2005
(60 mn bins)
54